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The problem of the "Good Life" is one which continues to
engage the attention of the most sensitive minds of our day. No
scientific and technical developments seem to make such a con
sideration irrelevant: indeed, the ethical question seems more
pressing in 1963 than it has been for decades, perhaps for many
centuries. It is significant also that after decades of pre
occupation with the basis ofpositive ethics in social organization
and social convention, sensitive thinkers are again exploring
the question of Natural Law�of the possible discovery of an
ethical norm in the constitution of nature itself.
Ethical reflection, originally regarded as an essentially
theological enterprise , now emerges as a constitutive dimension
of the scientific world. More and more, the men who are
responsible for the amazing strides in the realm of technology
are seeing that their task is incomplete without some careful
consideration of the questions of "good" and "right" and
especially of the realm of the "ground of right. " Such a con
sideration involves at least three interrelated elements, which
may be regarded as interlocking into a triangular form: 1) the
basis for ethics in "natural law"; 2) the relation of theological
ethics to the ethic of natural law; and 3) the relating of the
ethical norm to the concrete situations of life.
I
The ethical import of the world of nature is properly regarded
as an area for exploration by the philosopher. By way of
definition of the subject, it may be noted that "natural" may be
defined, within this context at least, as something differentiated
from thatwhich is man-made and hence artificial . This indieate s
that a natural-law situation is one in which action is judged in
terms of that which nature tends to suggest or to endorse . Seen
from the perspective of man himself, natural law suggests that
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in the action-situation, there are certain inherent or intrinsic
qualities, qualities which are regarded as being inborn or as
intuitively recognized to be valid.
The whole question ofnatural law, ashistorically understood,
has been called into question on several counts: as belief in
the biblical doctrine of Creation has been superseded by
alternative explanations, there has come to currency the view
that Nature may somehow be self-contained; as embodying its
own answers (in contrast to requiring a Creator to give it
meaning ) it has been interpreted to be amoral�at least so far
as our human values are concerned. That is to say, those of
humanistic orientation have held that all teleological interpre
tations are the simple result of the reading of our limited pre
ferences into the overall movement of nature. This is regarded
by the humanist as being sentimental and egocentric.
By this interpretation, an ethic of natural law would require
a severe re-interpretation. Values would become essentially
those procedures which nature obviouslyutilizes in the onsweep
of her processes, and in the final analysis, only those "values"
may be regarded as such which contribute to natural survival
and to possible evolutionary improvement. Thus , some other
source than nature must be sought for human values, such as
justice, love, truth, mercy, and the like. By some naturalistic
interpretations, these have no real basis or grounding in nature
itself; they issue solely fromman's attempts at the ordering of
human relationships.
A second basis upon which the concept of a "natural-law"
ethic is called into question is that of reaction against the
apparently-overworked appeal to it upon the part of Roman
Catholic theologians. As one eminent theological educator
liked to say, "Themajor difficulty with the doctrine of Natural
Law is that the RomanCatholic thinkers know toomuch about it! "
That is to say , the doctrine ofnatural law has become so involved
with an infallible and tendentious interpretation of its deliver
ances that the thoughtful person comes to view it with a great
deal of suspicion.
It is obvious, of course, that the Western tradition of natural
law, whether Protestant or Roman Catholic, stems from the
views of classical antiquity. Itwas second nature to the Greeks
to seek the permanent and abiding elements which underlie the
changing and the transient in both tJie realm of nature and of
human experience. Thus, classical thinkers sought to trace
Perspectives In Christian Ethics 41
comprehensible and traceable "laws" in terms ofwhich the world
might be viewed as unified and orderly. Moreover, the classical
view of Kosmoswas anorganic one, in which every phase of the
world-process was regarded as a part of a coherent and unified
whole.
Within this framework, individual objects were regarded as
possessing innate tendencies or innate laws of being. These,
moreover, functioned organically (and thus smoothly) as a
whole, so that it was believed that in the Kosmos one could
perceive a permanent order, which is essentially "lawful" and
teleological. Thus, there was a "natural" behavior for all
things, a behavior which was "highest and best" and which was
constitutive of the universe as a whole. Seen from the per
spective of human affairs, the Greek view posited gods who
were anthropomorphic and who were regarded as giving shape
and direction to human affairs.
Man himself was regarded as being truly-man insofar as he
brought to realization the potentialities of his essential being.
This presupposed an inherent and universal presence in man of
humanitas , which was the essential image toward the
production of which all processes of his development�whether
social processes, education, art or music�led him. Within
this framework, certain courses of action were indicated as
being "naturally" right or "naturally" wrong. These were held
to be discernible by the "wise" man, since they were deducible
by reason from the constitution of things. They were, more
over, held to be timeless in their nature and permanent in
their validity. Thus, they took relatively little account of
individual differences and variations in human needs, human
desires, and human sensitivities.
Perhaps more difficult still, this form of ethical thinking
tended to ground itself in a form of rationalism, by which it
was supposed that all right-thinking persons, given a fair chance
to reflect upon the nature of things , would reach identical con
clusions with reference to the interpretation of the ground of
Right in nature. The passing of the rationalism ordinarily
associated with the eighteenth century, and more especially,
the spread of the science of anthropology, has brought this
interpretation into serious question. It now appears that
equally sensitive and sincere persons may, by a dUigent study
ofnature, reach opinionswith respect to ethical behavior which
are diametrically opposed. Roman Catholic canon law has
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tacitly recognized this in its assumption (now codified by impli
cation in the dogma of papal infallibility) that natural law
requires also a divinely-accredited interpreter for the deri
vation of its mandates.
To derive the details of an ethic from the innate tendency
which is the law of any being, whether it be microcosmic (i.e.,
a particular fragment of the Kosmos) or macrocosmic (i.e.,
at the level of the whole) poses serious difficulties. First, it
is by no means clear that the inherent nature of things can be
read off with the ease that some moral theologians have thought
possible. It is one thing to assert that there is a permanent,
immutable structure of rightness at the core of the universe.
It is another to assert that this structure lies sufficiently close
to the surface that it can be discerned without serious margin
for error. It seems to this writer that the ground which is to
be cultivated by the ethical thinker who seeks his norm in the
structure ofnature ismuch smaller than is sometimes supposed,
so that the task undertaken ought to be much more modest and
unambitious than it is sometimes envisioned to be.
It should be noted , specifically, that the ethical clues
derivable from the consideration of nature and its structures
are probably much simpler than may be commonly believed.
That is to say, the deliverances of natural law may be far less
specific than its interpreters have thought. May it not be nearer
to the facts to suggest that the constitution of things reveals cer
tain broad principles, these being basic to positive ethics, but
from which no detailed precepts can be directly inferred ? Basic
to these principles is that of responsibility, of oughtness.
Oughtness is the essential characteristic of ethics; however dis
torted the elaboration of the moral norms may be in a given
society, humanbeings seem everywhere to feel a sense of obli
gation. That is to say, though men may by conditioning fail to
see precisely what is right, they do not doubt that they ought
to do that which is right. This seems to be tiie meaning of the
scriptural usage with reference to the law of God which is
written in the hearts of men.
Kant had something like this in mind when he suggested that
the authority of the Imperativewas not relative and hypothetical
(and thus defective) , but rather, categorical and absolute. Thus ,
the 'ought' is final anddefinitive; the content of that ought may in
practice be problematic and derived. It may prove to be true
that in the derivation of a universal sense of obligation to right.
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we have as much of ethics as canbe derived abstractly from the
nature of things. This does not of course rule out the possibility
that there may be further accurate derivation from the nature
of manhimself (as distinct from abstract 'humanitas'). That is
to say, from the nature of society, as based for example on the
psychology of man, it may be possible to deduce that such an
institution as monogamy may be that to which human nature is
basically conformable. Similarly, it maybe possible to derive
some notion of the right of private ownership from within the
pattern of common attitudes of individual men.
It remains, however, that the deliverances of an ethic based
upon natural law are more convincing when they are abstract
and formal, and less convincing as they become more detailed
and casuistic. The more inclusive principles (such as responsi
bility and accountability) appear to be immutable and indis
pensable, so that they can never cease to be binding. They are
valid, whether incorporated in statutes or not. On the other
hand, much of statutory law, however derivable it may seem to
be from natural law, finally proves to be relative to concrete
situations , historical circumstances, and individual
peculiarities.
n
The question of the relationship between theological ethics
and the ethics claiming to base itself upon natural law is another
of the occasions for a great deal of discussion. It is not sur
prising that extreme positions have been taken with reference
to this relationship. On the one hand, there are those who
would hold that the two stand in radical opposition to one another,
this being held upon the ground thatnatural law rests upon sup
posedly timeless and absolute factors, while Christian ethics
grows out of a historical and thus dynamic and relative view of
reality. In other words, some thinkers hold that the Greek
view of fixed and relatively static reality is so violently opposed
to the Hebrew-Christian view of reality that the two cannot meet
on any common ground.
This objection is not a frivolous one. It is clear that at many
points, the Christian understanding of things differs from the
classical conception of reality. However, one wonders whether
the contention that structure was the all-consuming passion of
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the Greek mind is totally correct. After all , the classical world
produced a Heraclitus as well as a Parmenides. Similarly, it
maybe questionedwhether the Hebrew-Christian understanding
of history was as "dynamic" and fluctuating as itmight appear.
After all, the underlying motif of New Testament theology is,
that the hicamation, the Atoning Deed, and the Resurrection of
our Lord were unique and non- repetitive events, being com
ponents of a once-for-all manifestation of the Eternal God in
time. Revelation in the Christian sense embodies what Emil
Brunner calls in The Mediator, "this element of absolute and
never-recurring actuality" (p. 26).
At the opposite pole of this interpretative situation is the view
that revealed ethics and the ethics of natural law are basically
the same in content, so that man may come out at the same
result by the pursuit of either one or the other of them. This
is essentially the Roman Catholic position. It has the merit of
unity and coherence. It seeks to confirm "by the mouth of two
witnesses" matters which are of very great significance. It
rests, moreover, upon the assumption that the author of the
Bible and the author of the "Book of Nature" are one and the
same, and thus appeals to the Christian sense for the unity
which all of God's activity manifests. The danger inherent in
the view is, that it assumes that both the Bible and the world
of nature become aspects of some higher earthly authority. In
other words, the Roman Catholic interpretation lends itself to
the assumption that there is a superior source (i. e., the Church)
which is qualified to read both "Books" infallibly, so that an
institution becomes the ultimate court of appeal in ethical
matters. To the Protestant, and all pragmatic considerations
aside, this seems to do poor justice to the internal nature and
the self-testimony of the Christian Scriptures. Moreover, an
institution which seems empirically relative and empirically
dependent upon fallible responses to temporal situations does
not seem to the Protestant a reliablementor in matters so vital
as those of the ethical life.
Somewhere between these two positions stands the one toward
which many Christian thinkers incline in our time. Basic to
such a middle position is the view that God is not only the author
of both revealed ethics and the world of nature, but also that
the universe displays His purpose throughout, a purpose which
is regarded as being unitary. It takes for granted that Christi
anity is rooted in history, a history which unfolds the "mighty
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acts" of God. But this position contains certainbuilt-ui perils,
and needs some precision of definition.
One peril is that of regarding the record of the historical
context of Christianity as being so largely a record of flux that
the permanent structures of historic Christian faith are
neglected. The Dialectical Theology has fallen victim to this
danger, i.e., the danger of seeing Revelation exclusively in
terms of "encoimters" which are highly relative to time and to
persons. In consequence , the possibility of a writtenRevelation
(which is propositionally articulated and imiversally valid) is
played down.
It will not do to contend that some one aspect of the career
of our Lord (such as the Incarnation) can be singled out as the
definitive moment of God's revelation to man. Rather, the
entire career of our Lord must be regarded as revelatory of
God's final and ultimate purposes, so that His supernatural
birth. His sinless life. His substitutionarydeath, and His bodily
resurrection are integral to the expression of themind and heart
of the same Godwho controls and articulates the world of nature.
Seen within this context, theological ethics appears as a
derivative of the divine action by which God moved into history
in the person of His Son, to unveil to man the purposes of His
eternal heart�purposes which had been revealed in incipient
fashion by the intimations of that whichHe had created earlier.
The latter thus appears, not as a mere republication of the
former, but as taking the abstract and general qualities of the
former and completing them in terms of the new conditions of
the "Son-order. "
In other words, there is a limited continuity between the
ethic of natural law and the theological ethic ofChristian Faith.
The limitation appears in nothingmore vividly than in this: that
the New Testament ethic brings to light entirely new duties and
totally new virtues. There is an originality about the ethic
of the New Covenant, growing out of the unique quality of the
revelation of God in the Incarnate Redeemer. Presupposing,
for example , the transformation of human character by Grace ,
the New Testament ethic demands a new (and we believe unique)
attitude toward an offending person. New attitudes are pre
scribed toward enemies, so that a new pattern of virtues is
introduced, involving such qualities as humility, moderation,
self-control, patience and forgiveness.
46 Asbury Seminarian
These virtues may have been envisioned from afar in an ethic
derived from the contemplation ofnature. Certainly exceptional
persons among the "gentiles who have not the law" may have
demonstrated these virtues. But nothing in the natural law was
sufficient to sustain these as a universal law of conduct. We
state it as a proposition, thatwhatever natural ethics may pre
scribe, its principles can be maintained effectively only by the
elaboration, confirmation, and supplementation of the law of
Christ. Even the highest forms of human, natural-law type of
ethic (as for example that of Confucius) failed to sustain their
own views of the eternal principles of right. In case of the ethic
of Confucius, there was almost immediate, and certainly wide
spread, confusion of "right" with the politically expedient and
the socially prudential. Without doubt many of the great sages
of history were able to recognize true duty, and to appreciate
the law of Right as it waswritten into the constitution of things;
but we see in theirpersonal conduct, no less than in their advice
to others, a sad inability to realize their envisioned principles
in practical conduct. The ethic revealed by natural law needs
the stimulation and .guidance of the law of Christ, the under-
girding of Grace.
Another factor essential to the discussion of the relation
which exists between the ethic of natural law and that of the
Christian faith is that ofmotivation in the ethical situation. Any
system of ethics may be flawless so far as its principles and
precepts are concerned; but it will remain abstract and inert
unless there be inherent in it that which will secure the pre-
formance of its duties, the cultivation of its virtues, and the
diligent pursuit of its supreme good. It is at this point that the
Christian finds his ethic to differ radically from the ethic
derived from the study of the constitution of things and of men.
Granting that lamentable deviations from the ideal can be
observed in the lives ofprofessingChristians, yet the Christian
asserts that there is a motive power in the Evangel which
energizes the Christian ethic.
This motive power is derived from themulti-faceted ministry
of the Holy Spirit�multi-faceted, we say, because it touches
the several factors which enter into the human ethical situation.
That is, it touches the reason, so that the mind is helped to
form the judgments upon which conduct is undertaken and given
shape. It touches the affections, which in turn attract the
person to one type of conduct and cause him to be repelled by
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another. It affects the non-reflective aspects of the Christian,
giving to the desires and impulses a new orientation , separated
relatively at least, from egocentricity. It is by virtue of this
touching of the total motivation of life that St. Paul could say
autobiographically, "It is no more I that live but Christ that
liveth in me. " It is of this that he writes as he speaks of "the
eyes of the understanding being opened. " And of the over-all
result of this, the same writer exults: "If any manbe in Christ
he is a new creature: Old things are passed away; behold, all
things are become new"!
It needs to be noted that this writing of the law upon the heart
is an occurrence wiiich goes beyond the processes usually de
signated as "natural"; it highlights the significance of the
dualism of Nature�Grace. It is this which the "natural man"
cannot receive; to him it seems foolishness at best, and hypo
critical scandal at worst. In other words, the man whose ethic
rests upon the observation of the world of nature is unable to
comprehend the ethic of the Christian faith. While the second
is of common origin with the first, it is also so far in advance
of the former that it cannot be understood from the standpoint
of it. To say it another way, the relationship between the ethic
of natural law and the ethic of the Christian Revelation is such
that the one whose orientation is in terms of the latter can
discern and appreciate the former, while the one who derives
his ethic from natural law simply has not the capacity to
appreciate the latter. Thus the relationship is one of common
origin and of overlap, but not one of reciprocal intelligibility.
A word needs to be said concerning the relation of the question
of conscience to the relationship between a "natural law" type
of ethic and the ethic of the Christian revelation. The study of
cultural anthropology has rendered much of the earlier
discussion of the subject of conscience to be irrelevant. To
some, this study has led to an abandonment, out of hand, of the
whole set of c on c e pti on s suggested by the term. This is
obviously, if considered in the light of the Christian Scriptures,
going too far. St. Paul does after all speak of the twofold role
of conscience as either accusing or excusing. At the same time ,
it must be recognized that conscience is not the uniform and
comprehensive function vvliich the term formerly suggested.
Mention has been made previously of the final and definitive
quality of the moral ought. It was observed in that connection
that the universal sense of obligation may be as much of ethics
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as can be derived from the abstract study of things. This is
practically equivalent to saying that in the strictest sense, the
factor of conscience, is apart from Grace at least, limited in
its scope of operation to the deliverance: "I ought to do that
which is right. " If so, then much of that which is denoted by
such sayings as: "Let your conscience be your guide," misses
the point, for in practice , men seem to perform with a good and
untroubled conscience all sorts of contradictory acts. These
are in some cases, to be sure, acts which are right or wrong
according to circumstance , and hence not intrinsically good or
evil. However, those who study the practices of other societies
tell us that men and women, with apparent approval of
conscience, pursue diametrically opposed courses with respect
to practices which seem clearly to possess intrinsic moral
quality�that is, practices which are right or wrong in them
selves. Certainly all usages cannot be right: and yet they are
adjudged to be so. From this, it seems clear that conscience
doe snot legitimately extend to the elaboration of positive ethics,
but rather, its proper deliverances are limited to the mandate
of "Thou Shalt do that which is right"! In the final section of
this article, something will be said with respect to the allegedly
specific content of the voice of conscience.
m
It remains to be noted, that just as the questions of the basis
for ethicsin natural law, and of the relation of theological ethics
to the ethic of natural law, are not without their ambiguities
and their difficulties, so also the question of the relating of the
ethical norm to the concrete situations of life involves its own
set of problems. Obviously the Christian ethic rests upon the
basic Good News, i.e., that in Jesus Christ, God has acted on
man' s behalf. But when one seeks tomove from this proclaimed
"deed of God" to the practical implications of that deed, he finds
it necessary to bear in mind certain principles of application.
Granted that (as Bonhoeffer tells us) the relationship between
the general mandate ofGod (i.e., the command to love) and the
practical acts of the Christian must be one of "conformation,"
it remains true that the momentary concretization of the
divinely-revealed norm creates many problems.
Protestantism has been perplexed by casuistry, the art of
"getting down to cases" in ethical matters. Pietistic Evangeli-
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calismhas tended to stress the possibility of certitude in matters
of applied, private morality, while liberal Protestantism has
sought to disown casuistry (in the name of the liberty of the
Christian man) while at the same time developing a body of
"normative" casuistic literature. Paul Ramsey has pointed out,
in Christianity and Crisis (March 4, 1963, p. 24), that in "pro
gressive church circles" there is a "Christian ethos that is
equally casuistical"�equally legalistic with that of pietistic
ethics. Actually, some form of relating the general to the
particular in ethics is inescapable, so that there is continuing
need for clarification of the factors which relate to the pro
cedures involved.
Each concrete human situation possesses a relatively unique
and singular character. That is to say, each point of ethical
decision contains its own problematic features, so that it in
volves a complex of possibilities. Now, the will of God is, we
believe, known to man; but it is known in terms of one of two
forms: either as a direct mandate, as is found in the Ten
Commandments; or indirectly in terms of precepts which relate
themselves to concrete ethical situations in historical contexts
different from our own. Or to say it another way, much of the
ethic of the Bible is in the form of precepts, which arise from
a different complex of factors. To relate such a precept to a
contemporary ethical situation, one must have ability to discern
the inner form of the precept.
To put it in still another way, in dealing with the ethical
precepts of the biblical record, one must utilize a twofold
movement. First, one must distil from the precept the principle
which it embeds; and second, one must re-apply the principle
thus yielded to the present historical moment and its complex
of demands. To take an exceedingly simple illustration: in
I Corinthians 14:34, St. Paul writes to the Church at Corinth,
"Let your women keep silence in the churches: for it is not
permitted unto them to speak; but to be under obedience, as also
saith the law. " Taken superficially, this passage might seem
to forbid all participation in public worship by women, irre
spective of time or place. (It is noteworthy that Paul restricts
the command to "your" women.) But upon closer examination,
particularly of the following verse, one finds that in the
Corinthian Church, public worship was interrupted by a dis
orderly practice by whichwomen , less favored with educational
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opportunity than the men, asked for a running interpretation of
what was being proclaimed.
Seen in this context, the precept is purely local, and encases
a principle, namely, that public worship should be orderly and
uninterrupted by ill-advised and ill-directed questions. Now,
having abstracted the principle (which is permanent) from the
precept (which is local and temporary), one can re-apply it in
the present worship-situation. And, to fail to apply this tech
nique leads to absurd legalism; for it is not always true that
the most obvious solution is the correct one. Certainly in the
relating of the Christian ethic in general to the empirical
situation, all is not laid out in primer form.
Something needs to be said concerning the concrete ethical
deliverances which are sometimes attributed to conscience.
Many well-meaning persons feel an absolute inner mandate with
reference to specifics in conduct, and feel that this mandate is
a conscientious product. If we be correct, as noted in Part I
of this paper, that conscience proper speaks only in terms of "I
ought to dowhat is right," thenwe must re-define what is meant
by the supposedly causistic function of conscience. Perhaps this
may be done in some such terms as the following: there is an
area of the personality contiguous to conscience, which under
takes to spell out specifics in conduct. This is influenced by a
number of factors: it is partly conditioned by personal prefer
ences; it rests partly upon imitation of the social and religious
usages in one's environment; it depends in part upon personal
factors between the individual and his Lord; and it may reflect
home environment and home training; and it has been known
to rest upon "crank" interpretations of Scripture. It should
be given a twofold recognition: first, it should be understood
as involving a margin oferror; and second, while the individual
should obey it, he is duty-bound to clarify and enlighten it.
To fail to obey it is to produce moral lesions of a grave sort;
and to fad to enlighten it is to perpetuate possible eccentricity
and idiosyncrasy.
The Christian ethic is an ethic of love, of obedience, of duty,
and of decision. Formally, its nature is structurally fixed and
relatively clear. But its content, as related to the concrete
occasion, seems in many cases tobe problematic, and relative
to the circumstances of action. In other words, the fundamental
principles of action in the Christian ethic are permanent and
immutable, while their application must take into account the
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mutable and the variable in concrete ethical situations. This
does not mean that in relating abiding principle to the mutable
situation, we are without guides. First of all, the New Testar
ment indicates clearly that some forms of action do not contain
intrinsic moral quality, such as the eating of meat. Thus, the
Scriptures embed the principle of liberty, adding that he who
claims this liberty is obligated to concede an equal right to
others. Second, the New Testament seeks to simplify the
positive mandates, subsuming all duties under the twofold
expression of the Law of Love. Third, the New Testament
makes it clear that our Lord left an example, and that we are
obligated to follow in His steps. This is valid, regardless of
the shallow use to which the principle has at times been put.
Itmust be remembered that the Christian ethic makes morality
to be a consequence of salvation, rather than a condition of it.
Enough has been said at the point of the three aspects of the
ethical problem under discussion to indicate that God has, in
His good pleasure, left many issues in the ethical life open to
human decision. While one may deal with the ethic of natural
law in an abstract and detached manner, the ethic implied by
the Christian Faith is one which makes perpetual demands upon
the one who ponders it. From first to last, it makes demands:
it presents challenges which sometimes tantalize, sometimes
perplex. It is as broad as human life , and thus avoids the over
simplification of any abstract and single-track ethic, such as
that based upon abstract humanitas. It forces the Christian
to commitment, to participation, to action upon decision.
This issue of The Asbury Seminarian honors our esteemed
and retiring Dean, Dr. William D. Turkington. This writer
has talked with a number ofpersons who have pursued the study
of ChristianEthics with our distinguished colleague; and student
after student has testified to the perpetual worth of the insights
which Dr. Turkington has imparted to them. Hearing this
"cloud of witnesses" the writer asked one of the able students
of our retiring Dean for the notes which he took in connection
with two of these courses.
It is a matter of gratification to note the manner in which
Dean Turkington was a quarter of a century ago, considering
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ethical issues which have come to the fore as vital issues within
the past five or ten years. His thought in this area has evidently
grown out of a keen sensitivity to human situations, along with
a continuing curiosity with respect to the implications of the
Christian Scriptures for "the good life." His insights were
thoroughly scriptural, always humane, and underlain by an
attitude of mind which recognized the priority of "doing God's
will" for the discerning of that will. His far-seeing vision
yielded perspectives, in terms of which concrete issues fell
into pattern, and before which the demands of our Lord upon
human conduct became vital for our common life.
